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Law
School
Accreditation:
The
Applicability of State Action and Noerr
Exemptions,
and First Amendment
Principles
Marina Lao*

I. Introduction
In legal education, the American Bar Association ("ABA")
has been the standard-setter for almost a century, granting
accreditation to those law schools that complied with its minimum
educational standards and denying it to those that did not.' While it is
sometimes said that accreditation is nothing more than an expression
of an accrediting body's considered professional opinion on what it
deems to be acceptable standards in an educational institution, ABA
accreditation actually holds much more significance than that. It is
true that, in theory, law schools are not compelled to seek ABA
accreditation. Nor are they forced to comply with its standards,
should they be indifferent to accreditation. In reality, however,
Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law (email:
Laomarin@shu.edu). I would like to thank Ed Hartnett, Michael Risinger, Charles
Sullivan and Spencer Weber Waller for their insightful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper. I am also grateful for the suggestions made by participants at the
2002 AALS Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation annual meeting where
this paper was presented, particularly Peter Carstensen. Portions of this paper are
based, in part, on an earlier article that I have written: Discrediting Accreditation?:
Antitrust and Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q 1035 (2001).
*

1 For a discussion of the history of American legal education, including the
genesis of ABA control over accreditation, see RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN
LAWYERS 40-73 (1991); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983); Harry First, Competition in the
Legal Education Industry (1), 53 NYU L. REV. 311, 333-400 (1978) [hereinafter
Competition f]; Harry First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry (II): An
Antitrust Analysis, 54 NYU L. REV. 1049, 1050-65 (1979) [hereinafter Competition

III.
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foregoing ABA approval is not a true option since securing such
approval is critical for the success, and perhaps the very existence, of
most law schools. That is because only graduates of ABA-approved
schools are eligible to sit for the bar examination in forty-two states. 2
Schools whose graduates are excluded from the bar examination, and
hence have no chance whatsoever of being admitted to the bar, would
naturally have a difficult time attracting enough students to be
3 The system, in effect, imposes a baffier to entry in
financially viable.
4
legal education.
Despite this fact, few would contend that accreditation is
inherently anticompetitive. It is generally acknowledged that the
system performs a procompetitive function, by providing complex
professional service markets with valuable information consumers
need for informed decisionmaking. At the same time, because most
2

See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR

Ass'N & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR
ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2000 10-11 (2000) [hereinafter BAR ADMISSION

REQUIREMENTS].

Additionally, the ABA is recognized by the United States

Department of Education as the sole accrediting body for law schools, which
enables students at the accredited schools to obtain federal financial assistance for
their education. See Complaint at 3, United States v. Am. Bar Ass'n, No. 95-1211
(CR) (D.D.C. filed June 27, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/cases/f0200/0254.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Complaint].
3 There are presently 21 non-ABA-approved (and 183 ABA-accredited) law
schools in the United States, of which 19 are located in states that do not require
graduation from an ABA-accredited law school as a condition for sitting for the bar
examination (16 in California, 2 in Massachusetts, 1 in Alabama). Only two are
located in states that do have such requirement (1 in Kansas and Florida). From this
data, it is clear that non ABA-approved law schools have difficulty surviving in
states that limit the bar examination to those with J.D. degrees from ABA-approved
schools. See BARRON'S GUIDE TO LAW SCHOOLS 557-63 (14th ed. 2000) (listing

non ABA-accredited law schools); BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2,
at 10-11 (listing states in which graduates of non ABA-approved schools are
eligible to sit for the bar examination); AM. BAR ASS'N & LAW SCH. ADMISSION
COUNCIL, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS (2000) (listing all

183 ABA-accredited law schools).
4 See generally Competition I, supra note 1, at 314-22; Competition II, supra
note 1, at 1099-1101; Marina Lao, DiscreditingAccreditation:Antitrust and Legal
Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1035 (2001); George B. Shepherd & William G.
Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation and Legal Education, 19
CARDOZO L. REv. 2091, 2219-29 (1998). But see Clark C. Havighurst & Peter M.
Brody, Accrediting and the Sherman Act, 14-AUT LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 199,
199 (1994) (arguing that accreditation, standing alone, is not a restraint but merely
an expression of opinion on quality by the accrediting body).
5 See Lao, supra note 4, at 1079-82, 1079-80 n.260-63 (discussing the value of
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standard-setting and certification processes (including the ABA
accreditation program) are administered by professionals in the field,
the power to exclude is effectively wielded by self-interested market
participants. When that happens, there is an inherent conflict of
interest and a potential for abuse of the process for anticompetitive
purposes; even the most selfless and well-intentioned decisionmakers
cannot be expected to consistently make neutral decisions or
assessments on issues directly implicating their own status, selfidentity, and well-being. 6 Accreditation or certification activities,
therefore, have obvious antitrust implications.
Given the significant impact that ABA accreditation has on
legal education and the profession, one might have expected
numerous antitrust challenges to the process, instead of the mere
handful that have actually been brought. 7 Indeed, in an analogous
context involving the medical profession, physicians denied hospital
staff privileges, or otherwise excluded from competition by negative
peer review action, have brought countless antitrust cases against the
certification or other decisionmaking body, usually composed of
other professionals in the field, alleging an illegal boycott in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 8 The boycott theory applicable in
these medical staff privileges, peer review, and certification-related
cases is, of course, just as applicable in the legal education
accreditation context. This then raises the question as to how the
ABA has managed to insulate its accreditation activities from much
accreditation in providing information to consumers and citing scholarship on the
subject).
6 See id. at 1090 (suggesting that lawyers' desire to uphold an exclusively
elite-model legal education might be partially influenced by concerns relating to
professional status, income, and other matters unrelated to public interest).
7 See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026,
1034-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (dismissing unaccredited law school's antitrust action
against the ABA on state action and petitioning immunity grounds); Feldman v.
Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1304-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that D.C. Court of
Appeals is entitled to state action immunity for limiting admission to the bar to
graduates of ABA-approved schools); Zavaletta v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 721 F. Supp. 96,
98 (E.D. Va. 1989) (dismissing an antitrust suit brought by students at unaccredited
law school against the ABA on First Amendment grounds); Brandt v. Am. Bar
Ass'n, No. CIV. A 3:96-cv-2606D, 1997 WL 279762 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 1997)
(dismissing an antitrust suit, on petitioning immunity grounds, brought against the
ABA over its failure to grant accreditation to a law school).
8 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 10-22 at 419-24 (1995)

(discussing such cases); Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health
Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002) (presenting

a study showing the types of medical antitrust cases that are most often brought).
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antitrust scrutiny.
One possible reason for the ABA's success in this regard is
the widely held assumption that ABA accreditation is immune from
the antitrust laws under one or both of two doctrines: state action; and
petitioning immunity (often referred to as the Noerr or NoerrPennington9 doctrine). Stated briefly, the state action doctrine creates
an antitrust exemption for state regulation, assuming that certain
conditions are satisfied, regardless of the anticompetitiveness of that
regulation. The Noerr doctrine provides a corollary exemption from
the antitrust laws for private efforts to influence government action,
no matter how anticompetitive the intent of those private efforts.
Since the rules for bar admission, including the critical one limiting
access to the bar examination, are promulgated by the states' highest
courts in the vast majority of states,10 and a state's highest court
acting in its legislative capacity is sovereign, it has generally been
assumed that any competitive harm resulting from ABA accreditation
is immune from antitrust review.
These two immunity doctrines have, thus far, successfully
shielded the ABA accreditation system from serious substantive
antitrust inquiry in every single private suit that has been brought
However, the last such case,
against the organization."
Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar
Ass'n, 12 precipitated a related Department of Justice antitrust action
against the ABA, 13 which was eventually settled in a consent decree
wherein the ABA agreed to discontinue certain accreditation
practices. 1 4 While a consent decree has no precedential force, the
ABA's decision to settle the case without first insisting on summary
disposition based on these two doctrines may well increase its
vulnerability and inspire more sustained accreditation-related

9 The term "Noerr-Pennington"doctrine is derived from the two cases that
first articulated the principles of the petitioning immunity doctrine: E. R.R.
President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
10 See BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2, at 3.

' See cases cited supra note 7.
12

107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997).

13

The Department of Justice initiated an investigation into the ABA

accreditation process, and subsequently filed suit against the ABA, after receiving
complaints from MSL. See John Yemma, Law School Loses Fight with Bar
Association, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1997, at B4.
14 United States v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 436 (D.D.C. 1996).
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challenges in the future. It is, therefore, perhaps an appropriate time
to re-think the assumptions generally made about the applicability of
either or both immunity doctrines to ABA accreditation.
This paper addresses the reach of both immunity doctrines,
and of the First Amendment, in the law school accreditation context.
My analysis draws a distinction between restraints on competition
flowing from the ABA decisions to grant or deny accreditation and
their associated use by the states on the one hand, and restraints on
competition emanating from the accreditation standards themselves
on the other. I conclude that, although the effect of the use of the
ABA's accreditation decisions may be immunized, neither doctrine
exempts restraints resulting from the standards themselves. In other
words, while the ABA may be immune from antitrust review for any
exclusionary effect flowing from state-imposed rules requiring a J.D.
degree from an ABA-approved school as a condition for taking the
bar examination, the state action doctrine does not provide immunity
to the standards that the ABA established and applied in reaching
those accreditation decisions. That is because the states do not
specifically adopt the standards themselves. Nor does the ABA seek
to influence the states to do so. With respect to the First Amendment
defense, I take issue both with the characterization of accreditation as
mere speech, and with the view that a restraint on competition
effectuated by pure speech is absolutely protected by the First
Amendment. Of course, even if the accreditation process is not
immune from antitrust scrutiny, whether it is unlawful under the
antitrust laws poses an entirely separate and complex issue which this
paper will not address.15

II. Background
The ABA began its accreditation function in 1921 through its
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar ("Section of
Legal Education"), which was created in 1893.16 Central to any
accreditation program are standards setting minimum requirements
that must be satisfied for approval to be granted. The ABA's
standards cover many aspects of the operation of a law school, such
as its curriculum, faculty, administration, admissions, library
"5 For a discussion of this issue, see generally Competition II, supra note 1;
Lao, supra note 4; Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 4.
16

See ABEL, supra note 1, at 46;

STEVENS,

supra note 1, at 95; OFFICE OF THE

CONSULTANT ON LEGAL EDUCATION TO THE AM. BAR ASs'N, THE ABA'S ROLE IN
THE LAW SCHOOL ACCREDITATION PROCESS 1 (1997).
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resources, and physical facilities. 17 Included among them are rules
requiring a three-year full time program for a J.D. degree,' 8 limiting
the student-faculty ratio, 19 prohibiting academic credit for bar review
courses, prohibiting correspondence schools, and imposing certain
requirements on library resources 22 and on law school physical
facilities. 23 The ABA makes its approval or denial decisions based on
an application of these standards, and it sends to the states annually a
list of all accredited schools, along with the Review of Legal
Education in the United States, the24 current ABA accreditation
standards, and any proposed revisions.
The ABA's accreditation decisions initially had little
competitive impact because no state before 1927 required graduation
from any law school, let alone an ABA-accredited one, as a condition
for admission to the bar. Anyone could become a licensed attorney
through apprenticeship and passing the bar examination, which was
then typically easy. 26 By 1958, however, the ABA, in conjunction

17

See OFFICE OF THE CONSULTANT ON LEGAL EDUCATION TO THE AM. BAR

Ass'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS (1999) [hereinafter
ABA STANDARDS]. The core of the standards was adopted in 1973 and periodically
amended since then. The most significant changes came about as a result of a
consent decree that the ABA signed in 1995 to settle a civil antitrust suit brought by
the Department of Justice. Under the terms of the consent decree, the ABA can no
longer collect faculty salary data or consider faculty compensation in accreditation;
or bar accreditation of for-profit schools; or prohibit acceptance of transfer credits
from unaccredited schools. Am. Bar Ass'n, 934 F. Supp. at 436. The ABA also
made other changes in 1996, including eliminating a teaching load limit and the
requirement of periodic sabbaticals; allowing some counting of adjuncts in the
calculation of student-faculty ratios; and making minor changes in the language of
a few other standards.
18ABA STANDARDS, supra note 17, at std. 304(b).
19Id. at std. 402, interps. 402-1, -2.
20

Id. at std. 302(f).

21

Id. at stds. 304(b), (g).

22

Id. at std. 606.

23

Id. at stds. 701-703. For a more extensive discussion of some of these

accreditation standards, see Lao, supra note 4, at 1087-88.
24 See Mass. Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 1030.
25

See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 174; see also Competition I, supra note 1, at

333-34 (describing vast differences among law schools in the post-Civil War period
and noting that they were not the only path to the bar).
26 See STEVENS, supra note 1,at 174.
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with the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS"), 27 had
prevailed upon all but fourteen jurisdictions to require candidates for
28
the bar examination to be graduates of ABA-approved schools.
Today, graduation from an ABA-approved school is a condition for
taking the bar in forty-three jurisdictions. 2 9 This rule, included as part
of the bar admission 30eligibility rules, is usually promulgated by the
states' highest courts.
With any meaningful accreditation system, it is expected that
some seeking approval will fail to satisfy the standards set and will be
denied approval. When the individuals setting and applying the
standards are, in a sense, competitors of those unsuccessfully seeking
accreditation, there is potentially a concerted refusal to deal or group
boycott claim, 3 1 thus implicating the antitrust laws, unless some
The AALS is an association of American law schools formed as an entity
separate from the ABA in 1900. See ABEL, supra note 1, at 46. Its current members
are all ABA-accredited schools. The AALS "accredits" law schools only in the
sense that it evaluates them for membership in the association, but its decisions,
unlike those of the ABA, have no impact on bar admission rules. See Mass. Sch. of
Law, 107 F.3d at 1030. See generally ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCHS., 2000 HANDBOOK
art. 6 (2000); Competition II, supra note 1, at 1078-80 (describing the close
relationship between the ABA and AALS).
28 STEVENS, supra note 1, at 207-08.
27

29

See BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, supra note 2, at 10-11. The only states

that permit graduates of non-ABA approved schools to take the bar examination are
Alabama, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Tennessee,
and Virginia. Id. In addition to a degree from an ABA-accredited law school,
admission to the bar in most states typically requires a college degree or three years
of college study; passing of the state bar examination; and approval of character
and fitness by the committee governing bar admissions. Id. (fully listing bar
admission requirements for each state).
30 See id. at 3. In forty two states and the District of Columbia, the states'
highest courts, with assistance from court appointed boards or committees, alone
control admission to the bar (which includes promulgating eligibility rules for bar
admission). In the eight remaining states, this authority is held jointly by the
legislature and the state supreme courts. Id.
3 The term "group boycott," also referred to as concerted refusals to deal,
covers a wide variety of conduct, including an association's exclusion (or limitation
of access) of others from their association or joint venture. See, e.g:, Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293-94
(1985); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1945). Trade or
professional associations are treated as combinations of their members so that the
activities of such associations are considered the collective conduct of their
members, thus satisfying the "agreement" or "combination" requirement of Section
1 of the Sherman Act. See VII PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1477 at 343
(1986).
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exemption exists. Although it was once believed that the antitrust
laws had no application to the "learned professions," such as law and
medicine, on the theory that the professions do not engage in "trade
or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act, that belief
was laid squarely to rest in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.33 Noting
that "the exchange of... a service for money is 'commerce,"' 34 the
Supreme Court, in 1975, refused to find the "learned professions"
immune from the antitrust laws. Subsequent Supreme Court cases
have consistently followed Goldfarb in applying the Sherman Act to
professional activities, thus making clear that these activities
are
35
considered business-related and subject to antitrust review.
In the accreditation context, an earlier court of appeals
decision, Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 6 held that accreditation

activities conducted with a noncommercial purpose were beyond the

See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931) (observing, in a case
testing the FTC's jurisdiction under section 5 of the FTC Act, that "medical
practitioners.. .follow a profession and not a trade.").
33 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Foreshadowing Goldfarb was American Medical
Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943), a case brought by the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department challenging the AMA's efforts to thwart
competition from a precursor to today's HMOs through an ethical rule that
prohibited its members from affiliating with those who practice medicine in that
form. While the Supreme Court avoided explicitly declaring that medicine was a
"trade," it found the physicians liable for an antitrust violation, noting that "the
calling or occupation of the individual physicians charged as defendants is
immaterial if the purpose and effect of their conspiracy was... obstruction and
restraint of the business of Group Health" (an HMO-like group practice). Id. at 528.
34 Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 786-88.
32

See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999) (requiring a
rule of reason analysis, not the "quick look," to determine the legality of a
professional rule banning a broad range of advertising); FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 432 (1990) (holding that the collective refusal
by a group of criminal defense lawyers to represent indigent criminal defendants
unless the government raised their compensation rates was per se illegal); FTC v.
Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 466 (1986) (finding dentists' collective
refusal to submit x-rays to patients' insurers to be an illegal antitrust restraint);
Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 357 (1982) (holding that
doctors' setting of maximum fees for specific medical procedures constituted price
fixing and was per se illegal); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 697 (1978) (finding professional rule prohibiting competitive bidding
among engineers to be an antitrust violation).
36 432 F.2d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
35
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scope of the Sherman Act. 37 In light of Goldfarb, however, the
continued validity of this case and its rationale is highly questionable.
Furthermore, in United States v. Brown University,38 a more recent
case involving an alleged agreement among Ivy League schools
fixing the level of financial assistance offered to commonly-admitted
students, the Third Circuit quickly dismissed the schools' claim that
their non-profit educational status provided an exemption from the
Sherman Act,
holding that the payment of money for an education is
39
commerce.

Because there is no blanket professional, non-profit, or
educational exemption from the antitrust laws today, it is
unsurprising that the ABA has faced some antitrust challenges to its
accreditation practices. Two of the more serious ones, a private suit
and a Department of Justice civil action, were brought in the mid1990s.

40

After being denied ABA approval, the Massachusetts School

of Law at Andover ("MSL"), a school operating on a low budget and
in conscious defiance of many ABA rules, sued the ABA alleging
that its enforcement of the standards to deny accreditation to MSL
amounted to a group boycott against the school and an agreement to
fix prices, in violation of the Sherman Act.4 1 The case was dismissed,
on a summary judgment motion, on antitrust state action and Noerr
42
petitioning immunity grounds, but not before it had precipitated a

37 Id.
38

5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).

39

id. at 666.

40 In addition to these two cases and the cases cited in supra note 7, the ABA

also faced a challenge from Western State University College of Law ("WSU") in
the mid-1970's, although no suit was filed. WSU, a for-profit law school in
California, was ineligible for ABA approval because of the non-profit standard in
existence at that time. Denied ABA approval, WSU applied for accreditation from a
recognized regional accrediting agency in order to allow its students to participate
in federal financial aid programs. When the ABA attempted to interfere with
WSU's efforts, WSU filed a complaint against the ABA with the Department of
Education. This prompted a Department of Education investigation and a
Department threat to remove the ABA's accrediting status. The ABA eventually
decided to delete the standard prohibiting proprietary schools but did not accredit
WSU, presumably because of other deficiencies. See Competition II, supra note 1,
at 1082-86; STEVENS, supra note 1, at 244-45.
41 Mass. Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 1031-32.
42 Id. at 1034-38 (holding that MSL's injuries stemmed, not from the ABA's
actions, but from the states' exclusion of graduates of non-ABA approved schools
from the bar examination, and that state action and Noerr provided antitrust
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related Department of Justice civil antitrust action against the ABA. 43
The government's case alleged that the law school
accreditation process had been captured by legal educators 44 and that
the ABA, under these educators' influence, formulated and enforced
anticompetitive standards and engaged in a group boycott of schools
failing to achieve those standards. 45 The case was eventually
terminated with a consent decree in which the ABA agreed to
discontinue a few of the challenged practices, 46 and to alter the
composition of the committees and organizations that control the
accreditation process so as to reduce the role of legal educators in the
process.47 Despite the fact that it had always prevailed in such suits in
immunity for these injuries).
43

Complaint, supra note 2.

44 At that time, 90% of the members of the Section of Legal Education, all
members of the Standards Review Committee, and a majority of the members of
the Accreditation Committee were legal educators. Furthermore, site inspection
teams that performed on-site evaluations of law schools for accreditation purposes
were typically all made up of legal educators. See Competitive Impact Statement at
4-5, United States v. Am. Bar Ass'n, No. 95-1211 (CR) (D.D.C. filed June 27,
1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1000/1034.htm [hereinafter
Competitive Impact Statement] (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
45 Among the standards and practices alleged to be anticompetitive were:
the
requirement that faculty compensation be comparable to that of similarly situated
ABA-approved schools; the prohibition against granting transfer students credit for
courses completed at unaccredited law schools; the requirement that schools be
non-proprietary; interpretations of the student-faculty ratio standard to exclude
adjunct faculty in the calculation of that ratio; limitations on faculty teaching loads;
the requirement that faculty be granted periodic sabbaticals; the banning of bar
review courses from the law school curriculum; and a few interpretations of
standards relating to facilities and resources. See id. at 5-9.
46 See Am. Bar Ass'n, 934 F. Supp. at 436. Under the consent decree, the ABA
is enjoined from adopting or enforcing any standard that 1) effectively imposes
compensation requirements for legal educators as a condition for accreditation
(including the collection of salary data and using that data in connection with
accreditation review); 2) prohibits member schools from enrolling graduates of
unaccredited law schools in a post-J.D. program or from granting transfer students
credit for courses completed at an unaccredited law school (except that transfer
credits can be limited to no more than one-third of the total credits required for
graduation); or denies accreditation on the basis that the school is proprietary. Id.
47 Structural changes mandated by the consent decree include the following:
1) law school deans or faculty will make up no more than 50% of the members of
the Council to the Section of Legal Education, the Accreditation Committee, and
the Standards Review Committee; and no more than 40% of the nominating
committee for the officers of the Section of Legal Education; 2) each site inspection
team will, to the extent possible, consist of at least two members who are not legal
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the past, based on state action and Noerr, the ABA settled the case
without first insisting on summary disposition based on these two
threshold issues, and it remains to be seen whether the ABA's earlier
invincibility on these issues will be eroded as a result. The following
section reexamines the common assumption made about ABA
accreditation: that it is insulated from substantive antitrust review
under the immunity doctrines of state action and Noerr.

III. Antitrust Immunity: "State Action" and Noerr
The antitrust immunity doctrines of state action and Noerr are
often said to express "the principle that the antitrust laws regulate
business, not politics": 4s state action "protects the States' acts of
49
governing and Noerr the citizens' participation in government."
Other than this truism, not much else is settled about the two
doctrines. They have, however, been applied to shield the legal
profession from antitrust scrutiny in accreditation and a wide range of
other self-regulatory activities. Lawyers, unlike physicians and other
professionals, have the luxury of coordinating their collective action
under the auspices of rules adopted by the states' highest courts,
which is then often afforded antitrust immunity as state action or as
legitimate petitioning of the state. 5 ° For that reason, although
Goldfarb was a case involving the legal profession, the brunt of the
decision, ironically, has been borne principally by other

educators; and an independent consultant, who is not a legal educator, will be hired
to assist in validating all standards and interpretations. Id. at 437.
48 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1991).
49 Id.

50 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that a
lawyer advertising ban was unconstitutional based on the First Amendment, but
finding that the bar association was immune from antitrust liability based on state
action); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (dismissing, on state action
immunity grounds, an antitrust suit brought against a court-appointed committee
responsible for administering the state bar examination and admissions over its
grading system); Va. State Bar v. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 571 F.2d 205 (4th
Cir. 1978); Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992) (dismissing,
based on state action, an antitrust suit brought against the ABA and others over
rules relating to the unauthorized practice of law); Green v. State Bar, 27 F.3d 1083
(5th Cir. 1994); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d
1026 (3d Cir. 1997); Lender's Serv., Inc. v. Dayton Bar Ass'n, 758 F. Supp. 429
(S.D. Ohio 1991); Guralnick v. Supreme Court of N.J., 747 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J.
1990).

,--A
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professionals, not lawyers. 5 1 The following discussion seeks to make
sense of these two ambiguous immunity doctrines in the law school
accreditation context, and to see if their protection should, indeed,
extend to ABA accreditation. It will also examine an additional
contention that accreditation is pure speech protected under the First
Amendment, independent of the Noerr doctrine.
52
A. The Antitrust State Action Doctrine

Grounded in federalism and state sovereignty, state action
immunity is intended to shield acts of the states from the federal
antitrust laws, even if those acts may be anticompetitive and
unwise.53 The doctrine began with the seminal case of Parker v.
Brown.54 Parker involved a California statute that established a
program fixing prices and controlling output among raisin growers,
and added the state's enforcement authority behind it. 55 The Supreme
See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1977)
(applying Sherman Act to a society of engineers); Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med.
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (finding a society of physicians liable for price-fixing);
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (applying group boycott laws
to a federation of dentists); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988) (subjecting
medical peer review committee decisions to federal antitrust laws). Physicians and
other professionals have no channel equivalent to the state supreme court within
which to conduct their self-regulatory activities. Thus, except in situations where
the state legislature steps in and enacts legislation giving effect to their regulation,
the (non-lawyer) professionals' activities would not fall within the scope of these
two exemptions.
52 The term "state action" as used in antitrust law is different from the concept
of state action used in civil rights cases under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
definition of state action is relatively narrow in antitrust law, as will be discussed
later, but is much broader under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis, where it has
been held to extend even to certain private actions with a "quasi-public" character.
See generally LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688-1720 (2d
ed. 1988). Consequently, conclusions as to what constitutes state action under
constitutional law have no application to the question whether state action is
implicated under antitrust law.
53 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) ("There is no suggestion of
a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's legislative history."); Omni Outdoor
Adver., 499 U.S. at 374 (stating that Congress did not intend to override state
interests when it passed the Sherman Act).
54 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
51

55 Id. at 346. The Act was passed during the Depression in the 1930's when,
according to the preamble to the Act, an overproduction of raisins resulted in "the
unreasonable waste of [the state's] agricultural wealth." 1933 Cal. Stat. 1969, § 1.
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Court held that state officials enforcing the raisin program were
immune from antitrust liability because the Sherman Act was not
intended to restrain "state action." 56 Because only state administrators
of the program, not the private growers who either orchestrated or
complied with the program, were named as defendants in Parker,the
Court did not address whether and under what circumstances private
parties acting under warrant of state law would also be exempt.
The resolution of that issue was left to a series of subsequent
cases, which extended the antitrust immunity accorded state officials
in Parker to private 5arties whose anticompetitive acts are the
product of state action. Three formal rules eventually emerged from
these cases. If the anticompetitive restraint in question is considered a
direct act of the State as sovereign, it enjoys absolute immunity from
antitrust review; 58 a direct act of "the state as sovereign" generally
refers to acts of the state legislature, the highest state court acting in
its legislative capacity, and possibly the governor.59 However, if the
actor is "private," then, under a test articulated in California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., there is immunity
only if the challenged restraint is taken pursuant to a "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed... state policy,,' 61 and the
conduct is subject to active state supervision. 62 A third intermediate
56

Parker,317

U.S. at 351.

57 See infra notes 58-65.
58 See, e.g., S. Motor Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 64 (1985);
Cmty. Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50-54 (1982);
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975).
59 See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-69 (1984); Parker,317 U.S. at
350-51; Bates, 433 U.S. at 359-60.
60 445 U.S. 97 (1980).

61 Id. at 105-06 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 410 (1978)); Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100. To satisfy this "clear authorization"
requirement, it is unnecessary to show that the challenged actions were compelled
by state law. See S. Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 60-61; Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985). All that must be shown is that the legislature or
state supreme court contemplated the kind of activity that is being challenged.
Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 42. However, it should be noted that "mere neutrality
respecting the.. .actions challenged as anticompetitive" on the part of the state will
not satisfy this first requirement. Cmty. Communications Co., 455 U.S. at 55.
62 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06. See also S. Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 58-59;
Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100; FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992).
Active state supervision is not met when the state "simply authorizes price setting
and enforces the prices established by private parties" because such authorization
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rule governs acts of municipalities, state agencies, and other
subordinate state entities. Not deemed "the state" for purposes of the
state action doctrine, 63 these lower level state entities must show state
64
authorization for their regulation to enjoy state action immunity.
are not required to show active
However, unlike private actors, they
65
state supervision of their actions.
MidCal seems to be based on the belief that federal antitrust
laws should give way to state regulatory decisions only if the state
has a concrete regulatory scheme that it believes would better serve
the state's interests than free competition. 66 But if the state's
regulatory intentions are unclear or if the state does not appear to be
taking its own policy seriously (by actively monitoring it), then the
merely "cast[s]... a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a
private price-fixing arrangement." 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 34445 (1987) (quoting Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105).
63 See City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co, 435 U.S. 389, 408-17
(1978); Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 38-40; Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568-69; Cmty.
Communications Co., 455 U.S. at 50-54.
64 See S. Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 60-61, 62-63; Town of Hallie, 471 U.S.
at 38-40; Cmty. Communications Co., 455 U.S. at 51-52. It should be noted,
however, that it does not take much for municipalities to meet this clear
authorization requirement. It is sufficient to simply demonstrate that the state as
sovereign intended "to displace competition in a particular field with a regulatory
structure." S. Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 64. Clear state authorization for agency
action has been found in federal antitrust cases even when the state supreme court
had earlier found that the action was unauthorized, and even when evidence
showed that state officials abused their authority. See Lease Lights, Inc. v. Pub.
Serv. Co., 849 F.2d 1330, 1333-35 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019
(1989); Llewellyn v. Crothers, 765 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1985).
65 See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46-47, 46 n.10 (concluding that active state
supervision is not required where the actor is a municipality, and suggesting though not deciding - that it is probably also not required where the actor is a state
agency); Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453, 1457-63 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990) (viewing state bar association as a state agency
requiring clear state authorization but not active state supervision). Active state
supervision is not required for municipalities (and probably state agencies) because
they are considered less likely than private actors to pursue private interests, as
opposed to state interests, in imposing regulation. Hass, 883 F.2d at 1459.
66 See Parker,317 U.S. at 351 (pointing out that state action doctrine does not
permit the state to "give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful"); Cmty.
Communications Co, 455 U.S. at 55 (holding that there must be a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy of replacing competition with
regulation in the industry and that municipalities are not simply free "to do as they
please").
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rationale for immunity disappears. 67 Where the sovereign state itself
is the actor, the state's policy is presumably crystal clear; moreover,
there is no state entity superior to the state sovereign that could
conceivably supervise the action. Hence, the two prong-test of
MidCal would be superfluous. However, if the state chooses to
delegate its regulatory authority to subordinate state agencies or
private parties, it is presumably prudent to require some
demonstration of state authorization for the restraint and, in the case
of private actors, also active state supervision before antitrust
immunity is deemed warranted.
One of the vexing problems with the state action doctrine is
that no solid theoretical principles seem to guide the determination of
which actor is deemed responsible for the restraint, 68 when a restraint
is considered an "act of the State as sovereign, ' 69 how much
supervision suffices for the active state supervision requirement, who
needs supervision, who can supervise on behalf of the state, and so
forth. 7° Critics contend that the doctrine lacks coherence, 7 1 and
"spawn[s] more confusion and litigation than certainty. 72 Some also
assert that there is often no doctrinal explanation for the courts'
decisions as to whether state or private action is implicated in a

See Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 636 ("[S]tates must accept political
responsibility for the actions they intend to undertake.").
212.6
68 See I PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
67

at 159-60 (Supp. 1989) (commenting on the "pervasive vexatiousness" of the
problem).
69

See id. T 212.2 at 127-31, T 212.9f at 184-87.

70

See id. T 212.7 at 164-67.

71 See, e.g., Eisner Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104

HARV. L. REV. 667, 668 (1991); Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism,Efficiency, and the
Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent
Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1229 n.5 (1995) (noting that "case law

exhibits a remarkable lack of coherence"); David McGowen & Mark A. Lemley,
Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First
Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293, 298-301 (1994) (remarking on the

"confused state of the cases" and the "doctrinal confusion" caused by the Court's

interpretation of the state action doctrine); William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism,
and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action
Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1109 (1981) (describing

the current doctrine as "internally inconsistent"); John Shephard Wiley, Jr.,
Revision and Apology in Antitrust Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1277, 1280 (1987)

(criticizing the state action doctrine as "irrational antitrust policy").
72

Elhauge supra note 71, at 674.
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particular case.73
In the context of competitive restraints involving lawyers, for
example, the Supreme Court construed the acts of a state bar
association as private in one case. 74 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar,75 the earliest Supreme Court case involving state action in
connection with the legal profession, the Court declined to find state
action immunity for the Virginia State Bar's issuance of an ethical
opinion requiring its members to adhere to a minimum fee
schedule. 76 Although the Court acknowledged that the Virginia State
Bar was "a state agency for some limited purposes," it treated the
state bar as a private actor 77 apparently because the Virginia Supreme
Court, which regulates the practice of law through the state bar
association, had not compelled the adoption of fee schedules.78
However, in other cases, the Court attributed various state bar
or bar committee actions to the state's highest court. 7 9 In Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, for example, the true actor was held to be the
See, e.g., id. at 685 (observing that the Court simply "ignored the clear state
action.. .and made the conclusory assertions that these restraints were
'private'.. .and thus not immune without active state supervision.").
73

See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See also Lender's
Serv., Inc. v. Dayton Bar Ass'n, 758 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (concluding
that state bar's prosecution of alleged violation of Ohio Supreme Court rule
banning the unauthorized practice of law cannot be considered an act of the Ohio
Supreme Court but ultimately finding immunity on grounds that there was both
clear authorization for, and active supervision of, the restraint by the state).
7' 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
76 Although the minimum fee schedules were supposedly merely "advisory,"
74

the state bar's ethical opinion provided that its "consistent and intentional
violation.. .for the purpose of increasing business can.. .constitute solicitation,"
which is a violation of the Virginia bar disciplinary rules. Goldfarb v. Va. State
Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
77 See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791-72 ("The State Bar, by providing
that
deviation from County Bar minimum fees may lead to disciplinary action, has
voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity, and in
that posture cannot claim it is beyond the reach of the Sherman Act."); see also
Lender's Serv., 758 F. Supp. at 437.
78 Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790-91.
See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Hoover v.
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984). See also Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding bar associations immune from antitrust liability where
their proposed disciplinary rule was adopted by the state supreme court).
80 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
79
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Arizona Supreme Court, and the action was therefore immunized by
state action. Bates involved an antitrust challenge to a state bar
association's enforcement of a disciplinary rule banning lawyer
advertising. 8 1 Even though the disciplinary rule at issue was part of
the Code of Professional Responsibility proposed by the ABA, and
its interpretation and enforcement was undertaken by a state bar
committee, the Court held that the real actor was the Arizona
Supreme Court, because it had adopted the rule and was "the
82 ultimate
body wielding the State's power over the practice of law."
In another antitrust case where a state supreme court's
involvement seemed even less direct, Hoover v. Ronwin, 83 the
Supreme Court likewise held that the challenged conduct "was in
reality that of the Arizona Supreme Court" and, as such, per se
immune. 84 The plaintiff in Hoover, a candidate who had failed a state
bar examination, alleged that the Committee on Examination and
Admissions violated the Sherman Act in its administration of the
state bar examination. His theory was that the committee, composed
of lawyers, had graded on a curve formulated to limit the number of
passing examinations and, hence, the number of potential
competitors. 85 In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the
complaint, the Court held that the real actor was the state supreme
court, which had appointed the committee and formally made all bar
admission decisions. 86 While it was true that final decisions on all bar
applications technically rested with the Arizona Supreme Court, that
court left real control of the examination and bar admissions process
to the Committee and rarely exercised its formal powers, as the
dissent pointed out. 87 Given this reality, the Court's holding that the
81

Bates is mostly remembered for holding that bans on lawyer advertising

violated the First Amendment right to free speech. However, the case is also
significant for its rejection of the plaintiffs antitrust claim on state action grounds.
Id. at 359-62.
82

Id. at 360.

83

466 U.S. 558 (1984).

4 Id. at 573.
See id. at 564-65, 569-70, 570 n.19.

85

86 Id. at 573. The Court gave three reasons for its conclusion that the state was
the real actor: the committee filed its grading formula with the state supreme court
prior to the examination; the state supreme court had considered and rejected the
plaintiffs challenge to the grading formula; and the state supreme court made the
final decisions on bar applications. Id. at 572-73, 576-78.
87 Id. at 588-89, 589 n.12, 592 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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committee acted as "the state," and not merely as a subordinate state
agency, is somewhat puzzling.
Lower court treatment of this issue does not provide any
clearer guidelines. In Lawline v. American Bar Ass 'n,88 for example,
the Seventh Circuit dismissed an antitrust complaint brought against
the ABA, state and local bar associations, the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission ("ARDC"), and others in connection
with two ethical rules that had been proposed by the ABA, adopted
verbatim by the Illinois Supreme Court (upon the recommendation of
its Committee on Professional Responsibility), and enforced by the
ARDC. 89 The court held that, in enforcing the rules, the ARDC acted
as an agent of the Illinois Supreme Court and, therefore, was immune
under the state action doctrine. The various bar associations were
held to have immunity as well, under Noerr. As to interpretative
opinions issued by the Illinois State Bar Association, the court further
held that they had no force except to the extent that the Illinois
Supreme Court agreed with them and, thus, it was the state supreme
court's actions (not the private parties') that had anticompetitive
effect. Other lower courts have tended to treat acts of state bar
associations, committees, boards and other state court appointed
entities as those of subordinate state agencies, or as completely

88 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992).
89

The two relevant provisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional

Responsibility prohibited lawyer association with non-lawyers (where any of the
association's activities involve the practice of law) and lawyers assisting nonlawyers in the unauthorized practice of law. The plaintiff, Lawline, was an
association of lawyers and paralegals who provided free legal advice to members of
the public over the telephone and also referred appropriate cases to outside lawyers,
who paid referral fees to Lawline. The Illinois Supreme Court's Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission sought to enjoin Lawline based on the
two ethical rules regarding the unauthorized practice of law. Id. at 1381.

90 See, e.g., Hass v. Oregon State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1081 (1990) (concluding that the state bar acted as a state agency
in requiring all state attorneys to purchase malpractice insurance through the state
bar, and was therefore required to show clear state authorization but not active state
supervision); Benton v. La. Pub. Facilities Auth., 897 F.2d 198, 203-04 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding that a public corporation of the state authorized to issue bonds
operated as a state agency in its selection of bond counsel and, therefore, active
state supervision of its activities was unnecessary for state action immunity);
Guralnick v. Supreme Court of N.J., 747 F. Supp. 1109, 1117-18 (D.N.J. 1990)
(holding that the Fee Arbitration Committee appointed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court acted as a state agency which probably did not need to show active
supervision by the state), aff'g 961 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1992).
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private acts, 9 1 and not as acts of the state as sovereign.
In an effort to harmonize the seemingly ad hoc judicial
decisions on state action, Professor Einer Elhauge has quite
persuasively argued that the dispositive issue in each case, and the
normative approach to the doctrine, is whether "the person
controlling the terms of the restraint'"92 is financially interested.9 3
Accordingly, courts apply state action immunity only when
financially disinterested officials control the terms of the restraint in
question. When the state delegates its decisionmaking function to
private parties, the persons controlling the terms of the restraint are
financially interested and, therefore, courts are unwilling to grant
state action immunity unless it is clear that the state both authorized
and actively supervised the private conduct, i.e., unless a financially
disinterested
party was ultimately in charge of the decisionmaking
95
process.
Even this paradigm, however, is not always helpful. To the
extent that state supreme courts usually act with assistance from court
appointed committees, boards, or state bar associations - composed
primarily of lawyers - it is often unclear who is controlling the terms
of the restraint: the supreme court itself (financially disinterested), or
members of the its appointed committee (financially interested). In
Hoover, for example, one could say that the Arizona Supreme Court
"controlled the terms of the restraint" since it had formal powers over
the entire bar admissions process. Under this construction,
immunizing the committee's grading activities as acts of the state as
sovereign would be justified. But it is at least as likely that the real
persons in control were members of the committee, since it is hard to
imagine the Arizona Supreme Court actually involving itself with the
formulation of the challenged grading formula or other details of the
bar examination process. Thus, determining whether the real actor
responsible for a particular restraint is the state, or a private party, or
something in between is seldom easy.

91 See Lender's Serv., 758 F. Supp. at 437.
92 Elhauge, supra note 7 1, at 685.
9' Id. at 683-96.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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B. Noerr (or Petitioning Immunity)
In Parker,the case from which the state action doctrine was
derived, the Court implied that if state action is immune from
antitrust liability, regardless of its anticompetitive impact, petitioning
the state for that restraint cannot be punished. 96 This implication was
made explicit in Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc.,97 a case involving a publicity campaign
conducted by a group of railroads against truckers. The campaign,
which included fraudulent and disparaging statements about truckers,
produced two anticompetitive effects: it persuaded the state to pass
98
legislation impeding truckers' ability to compete with the railroads,
and it also directly impaired truckers' good will with their customers
- an effect separate from the harm caused by the anticompetitive
legislation. 99 In other words, the second anticompetitive effect
flowing from the railroad companies' actions was independent of the
state action.
With respect to the first effect, the Supreme Court had little
trouble finding antitrust immunity for the railroads, simply stating
that "[j]oint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the
00
antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition."'
Petitioning immunity would seem to be a corollary of state action,
given the value of the right to petition in a democracy.' 0 1 Whether the
second effect should enjoy similar antitrust immunity is a more
difficult issue. On this question, the Court concluded that the second
effect should also be immunized because it was "incidental" to
legitimate attempts to influence government action. 10 2 The Court did
not, however, address what effects would be deemed "incidental"
and, thus, entitled to petitioning immunity. For example, is an effect
96

Parker,317 U.S. at 351-52.

9'365 U.S. 127 (1961).
98 Id. at 129-30.
99 Id. at 129, 133, 142.

1oo Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670; see also Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136-38; Cal.
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1971).
" See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137 (noting that "the whole concept of
representation depends on the ability of the people to make their wishes known to
their representatives," and that the Court cannot penalize citizens for making
demands of the government when the government is expected to be responsive to
their needs).
102 Id. at 142-44.
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considered incidental if it is small relative to the political effect? Or is
the effect incidental whenever it is related to the petitioning
activities? Or is it incidental only if it is necessary for petitioning?
As with state action, commentators have generally noted the
lack of doctrinal coherence of the Noerr doctrine, t03 its lack of "clear
moorings, ' 04 its inconsistency,' 0 5 and the uncertainty as to whether it
is based on statutory interpretation or on the First Amendment right
to petition.10 6 Although some of the doctrinal muddle in the earlier
103

The sweeping principle articulated in Noerr - that joint efforts to influence

the government do not violate the antitrust laws, even though intended to eliminate
competition - has been marked with conflicting and confusing exceptions,
especially in the early years. For example, there is the "sham" exception, which
was stretched to cover petitioning activities that were deemed improper, even if
they were intended to and did influence government action. A "commercial"
exception to the doctrine was also unclear and poorly defined, as was the
"conspiracy" exception. See generally Stephen Calkins, Development in Antitrust
and the First Amendment: The Disaggregationof Noerr, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 327
(1988) (discussing these exceptions and other ambiguities); Gary Minda, Interest
Groups, Political Freedoms, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of the NoerrPennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905 (1990) (critiquing the incoherence of
the Noerr doctrine). The sham exception has since been narrowed so that only
activities not genuinely intended to gain government action would be considered
sham. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 502-03
(1988). For further discussion of Allied Tube, see infra notes 108-22 and
accompanying text.
104Einer Elhauge, Making Sense of Antitrust PetitioningImmunity, 80 CAL. L.
REv. 1177, 1191 (1992).
105 See Calkins, supra note 103, at 338-39; McGowan & Lemley, supra note

71, at 363-64.
106 The cases seem to say that the interpretation of the doctrine is statutory, but
with an appreciation of the First Amendment right to petition. See, e.g., Noerr, 365
U.S. at 138 (casting its decision on statutory interpretation, but noting that ruling
otherwise "would raise important constitutional questions."); Pennington, 381 U.S.
at 669 (taking a similar approach in stating "[t]he Sherman Act... was not intended
to bar concerted action of this kind.... ."); Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510-11
(employing a more constitutional analysis); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1989) (seeing the doctrine as "[ijnterpreting the Sherman
Act in light of the First Amendment's Petition Clause. . . ."). For arguments
supporting a statutory interpretation approach, see Milton Handler & Richard A. De
Sevo, The Noerr Doctrine and Its Sham Exception, 6 CARDozo L. REv. 1, 4-5
(1984). For arguments supporting a First Amendment analysis, see Daniel Fischel,
Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and
Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80, 80-84, 94-96
(1977); McGowan & Lemley, supra note 71, at 361-70; James D. Hurwitz, Abuse
of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries of Noerr, 74
GEO. L.J. 65, 66 (1985).
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petitioning immunity cases has been cleared in Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 107 (and a few other recent
cases), 10 8 that case has created new sources of confusion and its
implications on standard-setting and accreditation are particularly
unclear.
Allied Tube involved the practice, widespread among trade
association members, of promulgating standards that are later
adopted by state and municipal governments. The plaintiff alleged
that Allied Tube, a steel conduit maker, stacked a meeting of a much
respected private standard setting association, of which it was a
member, with its own agents to defeat the approval of a competitor's
plastic conduit for inclusion in the association's electrical standards,
or code. 10 9 The defendant's activities allegedly had two effects. First,
numerous state and local governments adopted the code that Allied
Tube caused the association to pass, which resulted in the ban of
plastic conduit in those areas.°10 - Second, even in the limited areas
where the code was not incorporated into law, the exclusion of plastic
conduit from the code stigmatized the product."' For instance, many
insurance underwriters refused to insure buildings not built in
conformity to the code, and many building contractors would not use
unapproved products, irrespective of whether the relevant state and
local governments had adopted the code."12 This second set of harms

107

486 U.S. 492 (1988). This case sharply restricted the "sham" exception to

petitioning immunity so that it now applies only to activities not genuinely intended
to influence government action; real efforts to pietition the government, no matter
how improper and abusive, are no longer considered "sham." Id. at 502-03, 507
n.10.
108 See, e.g., Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. at 374-84 (overturning a jury
verdict, which found a conspiracy between a private competitor and municipal
officials to enact an ordinance harmful to another competitor, on the ground that
there is no conspiracy exception to either state action or Noerr immunity, except
possibly when the government acts as a market participant).
109 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 495-97. Allied Tube's methods were subversive of
the standard-setting process: it recruited (and financed) 230 new members
specifically for the purposes of voting at the critical meeting. Id. The new members
were rounded up for the vote and even "instructed where to sit and how and when
to vote" by Allied Tube group leaders "who used walkie-talkies and hand signals to
facilitate communications." Allied Tube eventually won by a very close vote of 390
to 394. Id.
"0

Id. at 495.

"'

Id. at 496.

112

id.
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- flowing from the stigma caused by the standard-setting
organization's nonapproval - was separate from the effect of state
adoption of the code.
In an antitrust action brought by the plastic conduit maker
seeking damages for the second effect," Allied Tube asserted Noerr
immunity as a defense.' 1 4 At issue was whether Allied Tube's efforts
to influence the standard setting organization (to ensure that its
competitor's new product would not be approved) should be
immunized from antitrust liability with respect to the stigma effect.
The Court's decision was complex. It first reaffirmed and
elaborated on the difference, drawn in Noerr, between harm caused
by the requested state action and harm resulting from "private
action." The Court held that where the anticompetitive effect or
restraint in question is a result of state action, those urging the action
are absolutely immune. 1 5 But where the effect or restraint results
from "private action," immunity exists only if the restraint is
"incidental" to valid efforts to influence the government, with
"validity" depending on the "context and nature" of the activities. 1 6
The Court further held that a petition to a private organization might
still enjoy petitioning immunity, if it was "incidental to a valid effort
to influence government action,""117 again with validity varying with
"the context and nature" of the activity in which it had engaged.
Applying this standard, the Court said the private standard
setting association was not a "quasi-legislative" body simply because
the states routinely adopted its work product. 119 Therefore, to enjoy
petitioning immunity, the defendant's efforts to affect the association
vote must be "incidental" to "valid" attempts to influence
government action. While the Court conceded that the defendant's
activities were incidental to genuine efforts to indirectly influence
state and local governments,
it said that the efforts were not
113

The issue of damages for direct harm caused by state enactment of the code

was not before the Court. However, the Court implied that such damages would not
be recoverable because of state action immunity. Id. at 500.
114Id. at

495.

15

Id. at 499.

116

Id.

ld. at 502.
I1
118 Id. at 504.
119 Id.
120

at 501.

The Court rejected earlier interpretations of the "sham" exception that
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"valid."' 12 ' Thus, harm flowing from the defendant's efforts to
influence the private association (thereby indirectly influencing
government action) did not enjoy immunity.122 Although it is not
entirely clear from the decision, the "context and nature" that made
defendant's petitioning efforts invalid seemed to have been the
defendant's subversion of the standard-setting process. 23 The Court
also ended with a broad holding that "where, as here, an
economically interested party exercises decision-making authority in
formulating a product standard for a private association that
comprises market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity
from any antitrust liability flowing from the effect the standard has of
'' 24
its own force in the marketplace.
Given the vagueness of the decision, the implications of
Allied Tube for standard-setting and accreditation, which is
essentially standard-setting, are uncertain.1 25 If the expansive holding
applies, then few members of a standard setting body would ever
have immunity for the marketplace effects of those standards (i.e.,
effects other than those flowing from their adoption into law),
because most standard-setting bodies are composed of interested
covered any form of improper petitioning, and specifically said that the defendant's
activities were not a "sham" since they were obviously aimed at influencing
government action. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502-03. The Court also rejected the
argument that petitioning immunity can apply only to direct petitioning of
government officials, noting that petitioning a private standard setting organization
may sometimes be the only effective way to influence government action. Id.
121

Id. at 503-04.

122

Id. at 509-10.

123 Id. at 504 (noting the defendant's "rounding up economically
interested

persons to set private standards" need not be protected).
124

Id. at 509-10.

125

In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justice O'Connor, stated that:

Conduct otherwise punishable under the antitrust laws either becomes
immune from the operation of those laws when it is part of a larger
design to influence the passage and enforcement of laws, or it does not.
No workable boundaries to the Noerr doctrine are established by
declaring, and then repeating at every turn, that everything depends on
'the context and nature of' the activity.. if we are unable to offer any
further guidance about what this vague reference is supposed to mean,
especially when the result here is so clearly wrong as long as Noerr
itself is reputed to remain good law .... [Lower courts] will be obliged
to puzzle over claims raised under the doctrine without any intelligible
guidance about when and why to apply it.
Id. at 513 (White, J., dissenting).
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market participants. If, however, Allied Tube's narrower holding
applies, then the determinative factor would be the tactics that are
used, and an interested participant who has not engaged in improper
methods of persuasion might still enjoy immunity.
Application of
126 State Action and Noerr to Law School

C.

Accreditation

Because of the ambiguity of the state action and Noerr
doctrines, determining their applicability in any ordinary situation is
enough of a challenge. Applying them to ABA accreditation is
further complicated by several factors peculiar to standard-setting and
accreditation. First, in accreditation, unlike most state action and
petitioning immunity situations, there is a restraint that precedes, and
is separable, from state action and petitioning: 127 an accrediting body
must set standards and apply those standards in making its decisions.
Even if state action fails or does not follow, the accreditation
standards continue to apply to the accreditation process. Second, state
action is usually limited to the official adoption of the accreditation
results. Rarely, if ever, is there state endorsement of the criteria used
in reaching those results. This factor raises the question of whether
state action immunity extends to ABA accreditation standards even if
it applies to the use of accreditation decisions in bar admissions.
Third, there is typically no current petitioning of the state: the
successful petitioning usually long precedes the particular

126

Because the United States Department of Education recognizes the ABA as

the sole accrediting body for American law schools, entitling students of the
approved schools to receive federal financial assistance, some might argue that the
ABA enjoys federal antitrust immunity. This argument should not succeed because
there is no explicit immunity granted under the congressional act authorizing the
Department of Education to designate accrediting agencies. See 20 U.S.C. § 1099b
(2002). And, the Supreme Court has long disfavored implicit exemptions from the
Sherman Act, noting that "[i]mplied antitrust immunity... can be justified only by a
convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the
regulatory system." Nat'l Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388
(1981) (quoting United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694,
714-20 (1975)). There is no clear repugnancy between the Department of
Education's regulation of the ABA accreditation system and the antitrust laws. The
Department's regulations primarily require that accrediting agencies have voluntary
memberships, focus on their accrediting activities, and make certain disclosures to
students. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 602.14-.26 (2000). The regulations certainly do not
compel or even facilitate violation of the antitrust laws.
127 A preexisting restraint, independent of state action, is also present when
trade associations set standards that are later adopted by the state, as in Allied Tube.
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accreditation decisions. 128 Thus, it is questionable whether Noerr
immunity has any application today, long after the successful
petitioning. Of the handful of cases dealing with antitrust claims in
the accreditation context, 12 9 only Massachusetts School of Law at
Andover, Inc. v. American13Bar Ass 130 has even briefly mentioned
these complicating factors. 1
Furthermore, even assuming that there is current petitioning
of the state, those efforts are usually limited to persuading
appropriate government authorities to adopt and give effect to the
accreditation results. There is usually no attempt by the accrediting
body to persuade the state to adopt the underlying accreditation
standards themselves. Therefore, it is also questionable whether
Noerr immunity ever attaches to the standards, even if it can be found
for the accreditation decisions.

128

For example, the ABA petitioned the states many decades ago to allow

only graduates from its approved schools to take the bar examination, and largely
succeeded in its campaign by 1958. STEVENS, supra note 1, at 207-08. Since then,
the ABA merely sends its list of accredited law schools to the states annually, along
with a copy of its accreditation standards. See supra note 24 and accompanying
text. The current ABA conduct - the mere communication of its accreditation
results to the states - may not qualify as petitioning. Thus, the real petitioning
associated with ABA accreditation took place priorto the accreditation decisions.
129 See Mass. School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d
1026 (3d Cir. 1997); Sherman Coll. of Straight Chiropractic v. Am. Chiropractic
Ass'n, 654 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ga. 1986), affid, 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir. 1987)
(holding that chiropractic board of examiners enjoyed petitioning immunity for
lobbying state licensing boards); Zavaletta v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 721 F. Supp. 96, 98
(E.D. Va. 1989) (finding that the ABA's denial of accreditation was merely an
expression of its opinion that is protected by the First Amendment, and is not a
restraint at all); Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(holding that the D.C. Court of Appeals was entitled to state action immunity for
requiring graduation from an ABA accredited school as a condition for bar
admission); Brandt v. Am. Bar Ass'n, No. Civ. A 3:96-CV-2606D, 1997 WL
279762 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 1997) (dismissing an accreditation-related suit against
the ABA on petitioning immunity grounds).
130 107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997).
131

See id. at 1037-38 (noting that although the ABA's petitioning activities

occurred before the 1970s, its current conduct in communicating its accreditation
decisions to the states was also petitioning); Id. at 1038-39 (concluding that
unaccredited school showed no antitrust injury, but noting that "the ABA is not
immune in the enforcement of its standards" because "the state action relates to the
use of the results of the accreditation process, not the process itself.")
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Exclusionary Effect of States' Use of Accreditation
Decisions

The primary anticompetitive effect of ABA accreditation
comes from the states' effective adoption of the results of that
process - through the state's promulgation of bar eligibility rules that
allow only graduates of ABA-approved schools to sit for the bar
examination. This exclusionary effect would be ipso facto immune
from antitrust review if the bar eligibility rules were considered an
act of the state, a conclusion that Hoover v. Ronwin 132 seems to
compel. As previously discussed, the plaintiff in Hoover, who
attributed his failure of the Arizona bar examination to the use of a
grading formula that allegedly limited the number of passing
applicants, sued the Committee on Examinations and Admissions that
had set the "curve" and graded the examinations.' 33 While the
Committee administered all aspects of the bar examination and
admissions process, the Arizona Supreme Court retained final
authority to grant or deny bar admission applications and had also
appointed the Committee.' 34 In affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs
claim, the United States Supreme Court held that the real actor in
Hoover was Arizona's highest court1 35 and the challenged activities
of the Committee were, therefore, per se immune. 136
In the most recent private antitrust case involving ABA
accreditation, Massachusetts School of Law, the Third Circuit
likewise found that the states acted as sovereign when they
promulgated bar eligibility rules. 37 Noting that every state regulates
admission to the practice of law in its own state, 138 the Third Circuit
held that the unaccredited law school's injuries were the effects of
state action because they stemmed from its students' inability to sit
for the bar examination in most states. Thus, the ABA enjoyed state
showing of clear
action immunity without the need for any further
39
1
supervision.
state
active
or
authorization
state
132

466 U.S. 558 (1984).

133

Id.

134

Id. at 561-64.

"' Id. at 573.
136

Id.

131

107 F.3d at 1036.

138 See id. at 1035.
139 Id.

at 1036.
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This conclusion seems consistent with Bates and Hoover.
While there is some functional delegation of authority to the ABA in
that the accreditation decisions (which effectively control who will be
affected by the exclusionary bar rule) are left to the ABA, the states
remain the ultimate decisionmakers. They are free to abandon their
reliance on the ABA process at any time, by revising or eliminating
the bar eligibility rule at issue. If, as in Bates, a state bar association's
interpretation and enforcement of a disciplinary rule is considered an
act of the state because the rule, though proposed by the private bar,
was promulgated by the state supreme court, then surely the states'
bar eligibility rules should be considered no less an act of the state.
Similarly, if, as in Hoover, the grading methods of a court-appointed
committee of lawyers can be attributed to the state supreme court
itself (which retained formal powers over the process), despite the
fact that the state supreme court obviously had little to do with the
derivation of the challenged grading formula, then it seems
appropriate to treat the bar eligibility rule excluding graduates of nonABA approved schools as a state act.
2.

Stigma Effect of Accreditation Independent of State
Action

In addition to the primary exclusionary effect caused by state
adoption of the ABA accreditation decisions, the ABA's
accreditation activities have another potential anticompetitive effect the stigma that attaches to unaccredited law schools as a result of
their unapproved status, which hinders their ability to compete on the
merits. This second effect does not implicate the state action doctrine
because it is independent of the anticompetitive effect of the bar
eligibility rule. However, under Noerr,140 this stigma effect would
still enjoy petitioning immunity so long as it is "incidental" to
legitimate petitioning activities. IT In other words, as long as there is
valid petitioning of the state, Noerr immunity will extend, not only to
the anticompetitive effects of the state action that may result from the
petitioning, but also to the independent effects on the marketplace
that are incidental to the petitioning.
In the context of ABA accreditation, this means that if the
ABA has validly sought state adoption of the restrictive bar
examination rules, any stigma (i.e., non state-action) injury to
'40

E. R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127

(1961).
141

Id. at 142-44.
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competition will likely be considered "incidental" to those lobbying
efforts and will be immunized as well. Given that most states require
graduation from an ABA-accredited law school as a condition for
taking the bar, the exclusionary effect of the states' rules (i.e., state
action) would obviously be significantly greater than any stigma
injury that might be inflicted on the unaccredited schools. Moreover,
discussing why it believes its seal of approval to be the only reliable
signal of quality in a law school would logically be an integral part of
any case that the ABA might make to the states urging acceptance of
its accreditation decisions. There is also nothing in the "context and
nature" of the petitioning that might be construed as invalid, as in
Allied Tube. 14 2 Accordingly, the stigma effect would most likely
qualify as "incidental" to the petitioning activity.
However, if the ABA has not engaged in any petitioning
activities, there is obviously no valid petitioning to which the stigma
effect can be incidental, and thus no possible Noerr immunity for that
stigma effect. In the early to mid-1900s, when the ABA waged its
state-by-state campaign to secure the restrictive bar eligibility rules
that currently exist in most states, it was unquestionably engaged in
valid petitioning. Under Noerr, as well as under state action, the
anticompetitive effect of the state bar admission rules passed as a
result of that successful campaign, is immunized. Furthermore, under
Noerr, if the petitioning also resulted in incidental stigma injury to
the unaccredited law schools at that time, that stigma effect would
probably also be exempt from antitrust scrutiny as an "incidental"
effect of valid petitioning.
It is an open question, however, whether resting on one's
laurels and relying on prior successful petitioning can be considered
current petitioning so as to immunize stigma injury today. In other
words, to the extent that the ABA's current petitioning consists of
merely sending to the states on an annual basis its list of accredited
schools, along with a copy of its accreditation standards, does that
suffice as a "petition" to invoke Noerr immunity for any incidental
stigma injury that might flow from the denial of accreditation? I
argue that it does not. If there is no petitioning to which the stigma
can be incidental, then, of course, no petitioning immunity for the
stigma effect is possible.

142

See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499-500.
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3. Restraint of the Underlying ABA Accreditation Standards
As previously mentioned, other factors in the accreditation
context further complicate the already difficult application of state
action and Noerr immunity doctrines in typical cases. Accreditation
and standard-setting inevitably include standards that preexist state
action, and continue to exist whether or not state action follows. Even
when states adopt the accreditation decisions, they typically do not
specifically adopt the underlying standards that were applied in
reaching those decisions. 143 There is also usually little, if any, attempt
to influence the states regarding the standards themselves, even
assuming that there is current44 petitioning of the states to give effect to
the accreditation decisions. 1
In non-accreditation cases, this overlay of standards,
independent of the ensuing state action and petitioning, is absent. For
example, if a group of raisin producers petitions the state to set
minimum raisin prices and the legislature obliges by passing a statute
so fixing the prices, there is clearly only one restraint - the price
fixing. This price fixing is protected as state action and raisin growers
enjoy state action immunity for "compliance" with the set prices. The
growers' earlier discussions among themselves on the price levels to
seek from the government and their efforts to win favorable
legislative action will also be protected under Noerr. If the attempt to
obtain government action fails, then the situation returns to the way it
was before the campaign (i.e., no fixed prices), but the growers' prior
agreement on what to ask of the government and their efforts to pass

143 In standard-setting cases not involving accreditation, such
as Allied Tube,
the standards are typically embodied in the "codes" submitted to the states for
enactment into law. To the extent that the standards are enumerated in a stateadopted code, the state has technically adopted each standard therein. As a practical
matter, however, it is unrealistic to think that, in enacting a code consisting of
numerous (and usually highly technical) standards relating to a specific industry,
states actually consider the substantive merits of each standard and decide to adopt
each into law. Therefore, there is no substantive difference between accreditation
and other standard-setting programs in this respect.
144 Similarly, in presenting a code of standards to the states for adoption, a

private standard setting organization has technically petitioned the state with
respect to all of the standards. But, in truth, a private setting organization, much
like an accrediting body, does not generally spend time persuading the state on
each standard that is incorporated in the code but, instead, urges state adoption of
the code in its entirety. Thus, there is little real difference between accreditation
and non-accreditation standard-setting in this respect.
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the desired regulation will still receive Noerr immunity. 145 Any
explicit or implicit agreement, however, among the growers to
maintain the prices and other restraints that they had hoped the
government would impose, even absent government action, would
not be protected petitioning activity but would simply be an illegal
price-fixing agreement. While the right to petition encompasses the
right to agree on what to jointly ask of the government, it does not
extend to agreements to adhere to the restraints even if the petitioning
fails.
In accreditation, the restraint that is requested of the
government is the exclusion (or disadvantaging) of institutions that
are unaccredited: the ABA asks that the states limit access to the bar
examination to graduates of its approved schools. The relevant state
action is the restrictive bar examination rule that states promulgate as
a result, which essentially effectuates the ABA's accreditation
decisions. The states, however, do not actually incorporate the
standards used by the ABA in reaching its accreditation decisions.
Nor is it likely that the ABA spends time discussing with the states
the merits of those substantive standards, even assuming that there is
current petitioning of the states to adopt the accreditation decisions.
Furthermore, even if some states choose not to give effect to the
ABA accreditation results, the underlying standards remain. Given
this reality, assuming that state action and Noerr protect the restraint
relating to the accreditation decisions, do these doctrines also extend
to shield the anticompetitive harm flowing from the restraint of the
standards? In other words, can the ABA be sued on the theory that
one or more of its accreditation standards are anticompetitive, if it is
found to enjoy state action and/or Noerr immunity for the use of its
accreditation decisions to exclude those who do not meet the ABA's
standards? I argue that it can.
In the only case that has even mentioned this issue,
Massachusetts School of Law, the Third Circuit said that "[a]lthough
145

The existence of petitioning immunity is generally not dependent on the

presence of state action immunity. In other words, even if no state action follows
(because the state is unpersuaded by the petitioning) or state action fails (perhaps
because the "state" response is not deemed an act of the state as sovereign and is
otherwise insufficiently authorized or supervised to qualify for state action), the
defendant's right to petition the government is still protected and the defendant
enjoys petitioning immunity. See Video Int'l. Prod. v. Warner-Amex Cable
Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1082-83 (5th Cir. 1988), cer-t. denied, 490
U.S. 1047 (1989) (describing the purpose of Noerr as protecting the private party
making the petition, and it does not matter whether the government agency acted
appropriately in passing the legislation).
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the ABA is immune from liability attributable to the state action in
requiring applicants for the bar examination to have graduated from
an ABA-accredited law school.. .under the Noerr petitioning
doctrine, the ABA is not immune in the actual enforcement of its
standards." 146 Although the Third Circuit's analysis on this issue was
rather limited, as it found no antitrust injury to the plaintiff, the
opinion
noted that to rule otherwise "would run counter to Allied
, 147
Tube."

Although I agree with the conclusion that neither immunity
doctrine should extend to the anticompetitive effects resulting from
the ABA's promulgation and enforcement of its accreditation
standards, the Third Circuit's reliance on Allied Tube is questionable.
Allied Tube is not really analogous to the ABA accreditation scenario
because the question in Allied Tube was whether and under what
circumstances the participants in a private standard setting process
should enjoy Noerr immunity for the anticompetitive market effects
of a standard that they had caused the private organization to adopt,
not whether the private standard setting organization itself was
entitled to immunity for those effects. 4 8 Had Allied Tube involved
the trade association deciding, in the normal course of its standardsetting activities, to exclude plastic conduit from its code and to
prevail upon the states to adopt the code, and the issue was whether
the association enjoyed petitioning immunity for the effects of the noplastic standard, then the analogy would be more fitting. Stated
differently, Allied Tube would be more applicable in a hypothetical
case against a few accredited law schools for urging the ABA to
promulgate, interpret, or enforce accreditation standards in such a
way as to deny accreditation to another law school (rather than in a
case against the ABA alleging that its formulation and application of
accreditation standards constituted a Sherman Act violation).
Apart from this issue, the implications of Allied Tube are
ambiguous in other respects as well. The Court in Allied Tube denied
the defendant Noerr immunity for the plaintiffs stigma injury,
holding that an attempt to influence a private organization is
immunized only if its anticompetitive effect is incidental to "valid"
petitioning, and that the "context and nature" of the activities in the
case (i.e., defendant's subversion of the standard-setting process)

'46

107 F.3d at 1038-39.

147 Id. at
148

1039.

Allied Tube did not address the issue of state action immunity.
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made the petitioning "invalid."' 149 This finding suggests that so long
as inoffensive or less offensive tactics are used, participants in a
private organization's standard setting process would still enjoy
Noerr immunity.
But the opinion also included a broad holding "that at least
where... an economically interested party exercises decisionmaking
authority in formulating a product standard for a private association
that comprises market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr
immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the effects the
standard has of its own force in the marketplace."' 15 Under a
reasonable reading of this broader holding, it would seem that if the
ABA accrediting body can be construed as comprising market
participants, then no one who plays a role in setting the accreditation
standards and is considered an "economically interested party" would
have Noerr immunity for the anticompetitive marketplace effects of
the standards (i.e., effects other than those resulting from state
action), even if no improper tactics are used. 151
Before the Department of Justice consent decree was entered
in 1995, the ABA Section of Legal Education (and its committees),
which administered the accreditation process, was made up
predominantly of legal educators1 52 and can be fairly construed as a
private association comprising "market participants."' 5 3 Although the
consent decree has significantly lessened the influence of legal
educators in the process, it is still almost exclusively controlled by
lawyers. 154 While lawyers uninvolved in legal education are not
literally "competitors" of law schools seeking accreditation, they are
still interested participants in the process because accreditation
implicates the status, income, and general well-being of the
profession as a whole. Hence, all lawyers may have a collective self55
interest in using accreditation to control entry into the profession.'

149

Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502-07.

IS0

Id. at 509-10.
See id. at 515 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority on this point).

152

See supra note 44.

While individual legal educators are not literally "market participants" in
that they do not personally compete for students, they have a substantial personal
stake in preserving the status of accredited law schools and, in that sense, could be
viewed as interested participants.
153

'-"
155

See supra note 47.
It is well documented that the legal profession, in the early days of ABA
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A broad reading of Allied Tube would mean that no Noerr immunity
would be available to the ABA for the market effects of those
standards, irrespective of the methods used.
While the implications of Allied Tube are far from clear, it is
safe to say that neither a broad nor a narrow reading of the case
requires extending state action (which was not discussed) or Noerr
immunity to the ABA's formulation and application of the
accreditation standards. To the extent that both doctrines are based on
statutory interpretation, then, as antitrust tradition demands for all
exemptions, they should be construed narrowly.' 56 Furthermore,
public policy would seem to favor denying immunity for the
standards themselves in these kinds of situations.
Where states adopt private standard-setting rules (including
accreditation decisions), their attention to the underlying criteria used
in formulating those rules is usually infeasible because accrediting
and other rule-making generally involve specialized fields requiring
expertise. Although state officials may have some experience in the
field, they typically do not have the resources or specific knowledge
to make substantive inquiries into the merits of the group's
recommendations, much less the reasonableness of the standards on
which the recommendations were based. When state officials adopt a
private group's recommendations, it is generally because the group
(perhaps by its reputation) has convinced them of the recommended
action's general desirability; the state officials merely place their trust
in the rule-making group with respect to the integrity of the
underlying standards. While the political right to petition is important
and may justify a group's efforts to persuade the state to adopt its
decisions, this right should not be broadly construed to shield the
standards on which the decisions were based, when the state was
accreditation, wanted to use the accreditation process to control, not so much the
number of future lawyers, but rather the social and ethnic composition of the
profession. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 100-01, 126 n.18, 180 n.3, 184 n.41;
JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 74-124 (1976); Competition I, supra note 1,

at 358 & nn. 273-74.
156 See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 127 (1982);
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (stating that "there is a heavy
presumption against implicit exemptions," even in areas where Congress has
enacted a special regulatory scheme). Even if the petitioning immunity doctrine is
based on First Amendment principles and not on statutory interpretation of the
antitrust laws, it should still be given a limited interpretation, since the First
Amendment protection for content-neutral regulations tends to be limited, unless
the regulations unduly burden speech and there is no alternative avenue of
expression. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 at

789-94 (2d ed. 1988).
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never "persuaded" on the standards but simply had to take on faith
their reasonableness because of practical considerations.
With respect to state action immunity, to the extent that the
states do not specifically approve (or even review) the underlying
accreditation standards, but merely give effect to the accreditation
decisions, the standards should not be construed as the act of the
state as sovereign.' 57 If the standards are not acts of the state as
sovereign, they must be clearly authorized and actively supervised by
the state to be entitled to state action immunity, which they are
clearly not in the case of ABA accreditation.
In fact, there is some question as to whether the various states
may regulate the uniform standards used by a national accrediting
body (such as the ABA) at all, even if they were so inclined, without
violating the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. In National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller,158 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals struck down a Nevada law intended to regulate the NCAA's
procedural rules governing the enforcement of its standards in the
state of Nevada, on the ground that it violated the commerce clause.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since the NCAA has member
institutions in over forty states and must enforce its rules uniformly
throughout the country, the Nevada law effectively forces the NCAA
to adopt Nevada's rules in all other
states, which constitutes a
159
Clause.
Commerce
the
of
violation
By analogy, it could be argued that if a state sought to tell the
ABA what accreditation standards it should apply towards law
schools located within that state, the same Commerce Clause
objection found in Miller would apply. The ABA serves as a national
accrediting body for American law schools and, as such, must have
uniform accreditation standards. If different states seek to regulate the
ABA's accreditation of law schools within their own borders (other
than simply choose to give or not give effect to its accreditation
decisions), it would interfere with interstate commerce in the same
manner that the Ninth Circuit found unconstitutional in Miller. If
state regulation of the ABA's accreditation standards is deemed a
violation of the Commerce Clause, then the state action doctrine
157

Hoover is distinguishable in that the Committee on Examination and

Admissions was required to file its grading formula with the Arizona Supreme
Court before the bar examination was administered. Thus, the Arizona Supreme
Court presumably had at least the opportunity to review the challenged grading
method. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 576 n.28 (1984).
158 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993).
9 Id.

at 638-39.
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would obviously have no application.

IV. First Amendment Free Speech Protection
Courts have traditionally based the Noerr doctrine on a
statutory interpretation of the antitrust laws, construed in light of
constitutional principles, rather than on the First Amendment right to
petition itself.16° It has recently been suggested that accreditation
should also enjoy free speech protection under the First
Amendment,' apart from any state action and Noerr immunity that
might be applicable. The gist of this argument is that accreditation,
standing alone, carries no coercive sanctions (the denial or
withdrawal of accreditation not being considered a sanction) and,
therefore, is no more than a professional group's expression of its
private opinion concerning quality. 162
Advocates of this approach draw a distinction between
collaboration for the purposes of standard setting and evaluating
whether particular institutions meet those established standards on the
one hand, and an explicit agreement to abide by the set standards and
sanction non-compliance on the other. 163 Under this view, an
accrediting program is said to fall within the first category of
activities and is not considered a restraint because it involves only
speech, which is protected under the First Amendment. If this
position is valid, then the ABA accreditation program would be
constitutionally protected as free speech, independent of any
immunity that state action and Noerr might afford.
At least one district court has apparently taken this approach.

160

See, e.g., Noerr, 365

U.S. at 137-38 (stating that the Sherman Act is

intended to regulate business, not political, activity, but also noting that a different
construction of the Act would raise First Amendment problems); see also supra
note 102 and accompanying text.
161 See generally Havighurst & Brody, supra note 4, at 220.
162

See id. at 218-19.

163

See Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 879 F.2d 397, 399 (7th

Cir. 1989) ("There can be no restraint of trade without a restraint.. .[W]hen a trade
association provides information... but does not constrain others to follow its
recommendations, it does not violate the antitrust laws.") (citation omitted);
Havighurst & Brody, supra note 4, at 213-16 (viewing accreditation as distinct
from self regulation, on the theory that accreditation does not include any explicit
agreement to comply with the standards set or any sanction for non-compliance,
other than non-approval).
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In Zavaletta v. American Bar Ass'n, 164 a trial court dismissed an
antitrust accreditation case against the ABA, holding that the ABA's
accreditation activities "imposed no restraint on trade, unreasonable
or otherwise." 165 Noting that the ABA never limited its members'
freedom to hire graduates of unaccredited law schools or to teach at
those schools, or restricted the unaccredited schools' access to
prospective students, the district court concluded that the ABA was
166
merely expressing "its educated opinion" in denying accreditation.
Additionally, it found the ABA's communication of its accreditation
67
decisions to the states to be protected by the First Amendment.'
The argument that accreditation is mere speech, and not a
restraint, unless there is explicit coercion or agreement to adhere to
the standards, is somewhat unreal. Had there been any coercion or
even a simple agreement on the part of the participants to comply
with the set standards, a restraint subject to antitrust review would
clearly exist. 168 While there is a conceptual difference between the
collective setting of standards and an actual agreement to abide by
the agreed-upon standards, the distinction is more theoretical than
real. In any standard-setting by a group of interested participants,
there is at least an implicit expectation or understanding that the
participants will follow the standards set, or the standard-setting
process would be meaningless. 169 Given that case, it is unduly

164

721 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Va. 1989).

165

Id. at 98.

166 id.
167

Id. In an alternative holding in Massachusetts School of Law, the trial court

also held that the ABA, in denying accreditation to the plaintiff law school, was
merely expressing a professional opinion that is protected by the First Amendment.
Mass. Sch. of Law, 937 F. Supp. at 444-45. In affirming the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to the ABA, the Third Circuit did so only on state action and
Noerr grounds, and did not expressly rule on the lower court's First Amendment
holding.
168 See Havighurst & Brody, supra note 4, at 212-13 (agreeing that "a
collective agreement to boycott anyone who did not follow its standards
voluntarily" or "naked agreements among competitors to sell only products
meeting agreed-upon standards" would violate antitrust laws).
169 See

Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500 (observing that an "agreement on a
product standard is, after all, implicitly an agreement not to manufacture, distribute,
or purchase certain types of products"). As previously noted, the accreditation
activities of the ABA Section of Legal Education and its committees can be
construed as standard setting by interested participants both before and after the
1995 consent decree. See supra notes 156-159 and accompanying text.
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formalistic to argue that such standard setting is merely an exercise of
free speech, when it is acknowledged that an explicit agreement by
the participants to conform to (or enforce) the standards would be
actionable.
The further contention that accreditation is merely speech, not
conduct, because it carries no coercive force on its own170 seems
equally illusory in a situation where the state gives effect to the
accreditation results. In a technical sense, compliance with
accreditation standards is voluntary. No law school is compelled to
conform to the ABA standards and no penalty is meted out to those
that choose not to comply, except to the extent that accreditation is
denied or withdrawn. Thus, law schools that are indifferent to
accreditation are perfectly free not to heed the ABA's standards.
Given the practical reality that ABA approval is essential for the
survival of most law schools, 17' however, it is disingenuous to say
that the denial or withdrawal of accreditation for noncompliance with
the standards is not a form of sanction.
In one antitrust case unrelated to accreditation, the Seventh
Circuit did say that speech unaccompanied by coercion or sanction
cannot be considered a restraint. 172 But the speech in that case was
classic speech and is very different from the so-called "speech" in
standard-setting situations. 173 Schachar involved a press release
issued by the American Academy of Ophthalmology that described a
new surgical ophthalmology procedure as "experimental," called for
more research, and urged caution on the part of patients, doctors and
hospitals alike. Several ophthalmologists sued the Academy alleging
that the press release was a restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act. Finding for the defendant, the Seventh Circuit said that
simply stating an opinion without constraining others to follow it is
not a restraint,174 and that "[a]n organization's
towering reputation
175
does not reduce its freedom to speak out."'
The court stressed that the Academy did nothing other than

170See Havighurst & Brody, supra note 4, at 212-16 (arguing that collective
accreditation, standing alone, sanctions no one and should be considered mere
speech, not a restraint).
171

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

172

Schacher v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, 870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989).

173

Id.

174

Id. at 399.

175 id.
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issue its press release. It did not require members to cease performing
the procedure, or discipline or expel anyone for disregarding its
warning. Nor did it induce hospitals to restrict those surgeries or urge
insurers to withhold payment for them. In other words, it was pure
speech, with no implicit agreements, and no coercion or sanction in
any form for dissidents. In contrast, in accreditation, there is usually
an implicit agreement of compliance with the standards among
schools participating in the process. There is also coercion and
sanction in the sense that non-compliance means a loss of
accreditation status or a failure to obtain such status, which portends
the failure of the law school.
In any event, even assuming that accreditation does constitute
mere speech, immunity from the antitrust laws does not necessarily
follow. That the First Amendment does not provide blanket
protection for commercial speech, i.e., speech related to the
"economic interests of the speaker and its audience,"' 176 isbeyond
debate. 177 In an analysis articulated in CentralHudson Gas v. Public
Service Commission,178 the Supreme Court said that for commercial
speech to come within the First Amendment clause, it must "concern
lawful activity and not be misleading."' 179 In other words, untruthful,
misleading, or deceptive statements do not enjoy constitutional
protection.' In a case involving a false pre-announcement of a new
product, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that a "knowingly
false statement designed to deceive buyers" could constitute an
exclusionary practice violative of the Sherman Act.' 8 1 Even speech
that is normally labeled "opinion" is not automatically entitled to
absolute First Amendment protection, 182 because it is understood that
176

Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).

171See id.; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-57 (1978)

(recognizing the distinction between commercial speech, which is traditionally
subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (stating

that, especially in the area of commercial speech, the government may restrict
speech that is not demonstrably false, but merely deceptive or misleading).
178 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
179

Id. at 566.

See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72; MCI
Communications v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1129 (7th Cir.), modified
by 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,520 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
181 See MCI Communications,708 F.2d at 1128-29.
180

182

See, e.g., Washington v. Smith, 80 F.3d 555, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("There
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18 3
expressions of opinion "often imply an assertion of objective fact'
that can be as deceptive or misleading as statements of fact. 184 It
would be hard, of course, to characterize the normative judgment of
an accreditation standard as a lie, or as deceptive.185
However, even for speech that concerns lawful activity and is
not misleading, government regulation would still be permissible
under Central Hudson, if the government interest in the regulation is
substantial, if the regulation directly advances the government
interest, and if the regulation of the speech in question is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.186 Preventing anticompetitive conduct,
which application of the antitrust laws is intended to do, is obviously
a substantial government interest; applying the antitrust laws to
alleged restraints of trade that are effectuated by speech, not overt
acts, directly advances that government interest. To afford blanket
First Amendment protection to seals of approval, standard-setting,
and accreditation on the ground that mere speech is involved would
be to ignore market realities. Restraints of trade can be effectuated by
speech, as well as by overt acts, and they can be just as harmful to
competition. For example, if a group of competitors creates a seal of
approval based on rather subjective factors and denies approval to
pesky competitors for the primary purpose of excluding or
disadvantaging them (due to the unwillingness of suppliers and
customers to deal with those without the seal of approval), the effects
of this "speech" may be as anticompetitive as if the parties had
engaged in a boycott through traditional "conduct" activities. In that
event, the government's interest in preventing these anticompetitive
effects is substantial and the use of the antitrust laws to circumscribe
the "speech" directly serves this government interest. Thus, under
Hudson, the application of the antitrust laws to such commercial
speech is entirely appropriate assuming that its use is no broader than
necessary.
Similarly, if it is alleged, in a law school accreditation case,

is no categorical First Amendment immunity against defamation suits for
statements of opinion."); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19
(1990) (statements couched as opinion but implying a false assertion of fact may be
actionable libel).
183 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18.
184

Id. at 19.

185

On the other hand, an inaccurate finding of non-compliance with the

standards, rather than the judgment guiding the formulation of the standards, can be
more easily attacked as untruthful or deceptive.
186

Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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that any of the ABA accreditation standards ("speech") were
promulgated to lessen competition, it would seem that subjecting the
"speech" to antitrust review would advance a substantial government
interest. To the extent that a rule of reason analysis is applied to
determine antitrust liability, the regulation is "not more extensive
than is necessary"' 87 to serve the government interest in protecting
competition, and should be permissible under the First Amendment.

V. What Lies Ahead
As a historical matter, ABA accreditation had little market
impact until the organization succeeded in securing the backing of
most states, in the form of state-promulgated bar eligibility rules that
catapulted ABA approval from being a desirable status symbol for
law schools to being a formidable barrier to entry. It is the states'
action in giving effect to the ABA's accreditation decisions that has
legally protected the organization, under state action and Noerr, from
all previous private antitrust challenges to its accreditation activities.
Recently, however, the ABA chose not to aggressively assert these
threshold immunity doctrines by agreeing to a settlement in the
accreditation suit brought against it by the Justice Department
without first insisting on summary disposition based on these two
doctrines. Although a consent decree obviously has no precedential
impact, the ABA's concession may nonetheless leave it more
vulnerable on the immunity issue. At the very least, it is likely to
encourage more accreditation-related suits and perhaps more resolute
arguments from future plaintiffs for limiting the scope of these
immunity doctrines.
I argue in this paper that the case for extending state action
and Noerr immunity to all ABA accreditation related activities is not
very strong, despite common assumptions to the contrary. While the
anticompetitive effect that flows from state bar rules limiting bar
admission to graduates of ABA-accredited schools may well
constitute state action, it is questionable whether any stigma effect
caused by ABA accreditation is protected by Noerr. Furthermore, it is
doubtful that either state action or Noerr insulates the underlying
accreditation standards from antitrust review because there is usually
neither state action nor ABA petitioning involving the standards
themselves. The day may come soon when the ABA accreditation
system must stand or fall on the merits.

187

Id.

